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Abstract 
Over the past decades, there has been a substantial increase in female labor force participation and the 
number of dual-earner and female-earner households has risen throughout western countries. However, the 
recent economic crisis has caused large losses in employment for both women and men, potentially yielding 
unexpected consequences for the evolution of work-family arrangements. This article carries out a 
comparative analysis of the relationship between the 2008/2009 economic crisis and work-family 
arrangements in Europe. Using multinomial logistic regression models data from six countries of European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 2005/2012) the article fills a gap in the 
literature by addressing three issues: i) whether work-family arrangements have changed from before to after 
the beginning of the economic downturn in countries with different gender and welfare regimes (Germany, 
Greece, Spain, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom); ii) whether changes in work-family arrangements 
have occurred at different levels of the social strata; iii) whether couples have moved from dual-earner to 
male or female breadwinner. The results indicate changes in work-family arrangements in those countries 
worst hit by the economic crisis, Greece and Spain, where dual-earner and male-breadwinner households 
have decreased and no-earner and female-main-earner households have increased. Moreover, the results 
show that in these two countries all social strata – proxied through women’s level of education – have been 
affected by the crisis. In contrast, only moderate changes in work-family arrangements among all women can 
be observed in countries less hit by the economic downturn. The findings for the two southern European 
countries are troubling, as the increases in no-earner and female-breadwinner households point to worsening 
economic conditions throughout the population and to a halt in the process that for several decades had been 
leading to more equality in the distribution of employment between genders. 
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Introduction 
This article takes a comparative approach to assess the relationship between the recent economic 
crisis and the work-family arrangements of women with different levels of education in six 
European countries. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, women’s economic and social 
standing in Western countries has largely improved. Indeed, never as much as today are women 
present in education (Breen et al., 2010), politics (Inter-parliamentary Union, 2014) and especially 
employment (Bettio et al., 2013; Eurostat, 2016). Women’s increased presence in the work force has 
modified what are known as ‘work-family arrangements’, that is, the distribution of working hours 
between partners. Data for a variety of European countries representing different welfare (Esping-
Andersen, 1999) and care regimes (Korpi, 2000; Lewis, 1992) show that, over the past twenty years, 
couples have moved away from the male-breadwinner model toward the one-and-a-half-earner 
model and the dual-earner model (Lewis, 2001; OECD, 2016). Despite the common shift toward a 
more equal participation in paid work between partners, work-family arrangements vary notably 
between European countries (Lewis et al., 2008; Hook, 2015). Indeed, research shows that while the 
dual-earner model is quite common in Scandinavian countries – the so-called “social democratic” 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1999) – the one-and-a-half-earner model is predominant in liberal 
and conservatives countries, such as the UK and Germany (Lewis et al., 2008). In southern Europe, 
by contrast, work-family arrangements appear to be severely affected by social class so that families 
“polarize between the dual full-time and male-breadwinner families” (Hook, 2015, p.15). In 
particular, women with higher levels of education are more likely to be part of dual-earner 
households as compared to women with lower education, with important implications for 
inequalities between women, above those between women and men. 
In this scenario, the global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis that hit 
Europe from 2008 might have had unexpected consequences for the ongoing transformations of 
work-family arrangements. On the one hand, growing levels of unemployment in typically male 
sectors such as manufacturing could have reduced men’s ability of being full-time earners (Hoynes 
et al., 2012; Rubery, 2014). This reduction could translate into a growth of no-earner households or 
− in combination with an “added worker effect” (Lundberg, 1985; Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-
Gutiérrez, 2003) − into a growth in female-breadwinner households. On the other hand, the cuts in 
the public sector due to austerity measures – regarding both services and jobs – might have shifted 
part of the negative consequences of the crisis on women’s employment (Karamessini and Rubery, 
2014). Considering that the countries hit the hardest by the crisis were also the ones where women 
were less employed to begin with (e.g. Greece and Spain), the recession might have had deleterious 
consequences on gender inequalities in employment. Furthermore, economic downturns affect 
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subjects at different levels of the social strata in different ways (De Lange et al., 2013; Hoynes et 
al., 2012; Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). Therefore, the impact of the crisis on work-family 
arrangements might vary along the lines of class, income and education (Hook, 2015). 
There are several reasons for which the pre-crisis growing shift toward greater gender equality in 
work-family arrangements is considered a positive outcome. At the macro level, scholars have 
emphasized the “economic case” for gender equality in employment, stressing that female and 
maternal employment are not just beneficial to the cause of gender equality per se, but also that 
having more women in the work force fosters economic growth (Smith et al., 2013). Moreover, 
scholars have underlined the tight link between the sub-replacement fertility rates that have 
characterized many European countries over the past decades and gender inequality in employment 
and wages (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2013). At the individual level, studies have shown 
that there is a tight relationship between female and maternal employment and household poverty 
(Barbieri and Bozzon, 2016; Troger and Verwiebe, 2015). Moreover, greater equality in 
employment translates into a more equal division of domestic work (Dotti Sani, 2014). On top, full-
time employed mothers appear to be happier than homemakers (Berger, 2013) and maternal 
employment has positive spillovers for children’s well-being (Cooklin et al., 2014). Thus, it is not 
surprising that the European Union has aimed at increasing female labor force participation 
(Council of the European Union, 2011). 
Despite many cross-national studies on work-family arrangements within and between countries 
(Lewis, 2001; Lewis et al., 2008; Hook, 2015), the literature is lacking empirical evidence on the 
link between the economic crisis and work-family arrangements. Therefore, this article has two 
objectives: first, to carry out a comparative analysis on the relationship between the economic and 
sovereign debt crisis and work-family arrangements in different European countries; second, to 
investigate whether such relationship varied among households from different social strata, proxied 
through the woman’s level of education. Multinomial logistic regression models on six countries 
belonging to different welfare and gender regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000) are 
applied on data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC, 
2005/2012, for Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom). 
It is important to underline that the cross-sectional nature of the data and the research strategy 
adopted do not allow us to assess the causal relationship between the economic crisis and changes 
in work-family arrangements. Indeed, it is plausible that European welfare states’ reaction to the 
crisis lead to changing divisions of labor between women and men. However, it is also possible that 
other events occuring during the years of the economic crisis, for example policy reforms, might 
have triggered changes in work-family arrangements that we cannot account for. 
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Beyond this aspect, the article offers important insights. First, the results indicate large 
differences in the evolution of work-family arrangements among countries hit differently by the 
economic and sovereign debt crisis: in countries where the economic downturn hit strongly − 
Greece and Spain – dual-earner households decreased. Instead, in countries where the crisis has 
been less harsh, dual-earner households remained stable or grew. Second, the article explores 
changes in work-family arrangements among women with different levels of education, an 
important aspect considering the relevance of women’s education for work-family arrangements in 
different countries (Hook, 2015). The results show that differences in work-family arrangements 
between women with different levels of education have remained rather stable in the countries less 
hit by the economic crisis. In countries badly hit by the economic downturn, instead, the decrease in 
dual-earner households is observed at all levels of education and the chances of becoming a 
household with no earners is higher among couples where the woman is lower educated. Overall, 
the findings are troubling, as they indicate a slowdown in the achievement of a more gender equal 
society in countries that already had low levels of gender equality in employment to begin with. 
 
Background 
Work-family arrangements in European countries 
Over the past decades, female and maternal labor force participation rates have grown a lot in 
Western countries in general and in the six countries considered in this article. Figure 1 below 
reports female and male employment from 1995 to 2014 in Germany, Greece, Spain, France, 
Sweden and the UK (Eurostat, 2016). As can be seen in the left hand side panel of the figure, up to 
2008/09 (indicated by the grey shaded area) the percentage of employed women increased notably, 
especially in Greece and Spain. Indeed, female employment peaked in 2008 at 55.4% in Spain and 
48.9% in 2009 in Greece. In 1995, female employment rates were lower than elsewhere, 31.7% and 
38% respectively. Increases in female employment are evident also in France and Germany 
throughout the period while in the UK and Sweden ‒ where female employment was notably higher 
already in 1995 ‒ the growth has been less evident. Importantly, after the financial crisis, female 
employment decreased notably in Spain and Greece while it remained rather stable in France and 
the UK and even grew in Sweden and Germany. Male employment ‒ plotted in the right hand side 
panel of figure 1 ‒ is higher than female employment in all countries, in some cases considerably 
higher, and overall more stable over the years. An important point to make is that mothers and 
childless women differ in their labor market behavior. Indeed, mothers have lower chances of being 
employed than childless women and, when employed, they tend to work shorter hours (Boeckmann 
et al., 2015). However, official time series data on maternal employment rates do not go sufficiently 
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back in time to offer a meaningful pre-post crisis comparison. In contrast, female and male 
employment rates include data from both childless women and men, mothers and fathers. Therefore, 
they offer a good starting point for the understanding of work-family arrangements in comparative 
perspective and over time. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Considering the differences in female and male employment in the six countries, cross-national 
differences in work-family arrangements are not surprising. In fact, work-family arrangements are 
generally understood as the combination of the employment statuses and working hours of the 
members of a couple that are used to assess the ‘commitment’ to the labor market of each partner. 
Being employed full-time, part-time, or not employed are the three categories that are mainly used 
to classify individual work commitment. By combining the partners’ working efforts, previous 
studies have identified five typical arrangements. Three of these are the most common: 1) the dual-
earner model, where both members of the couples are employed and work the same hours; 2) the 
one-and-a-half-earner model, where the man is employed full-time and the woman works part-time; 
and 3) the male-breadwinner model that sees the man working full-time and the women in full-time 
homemaking. Other two categories are less frequent and are sometimes associated with poorer 
economic conditions (Winslow-Bowe, 2006): 4) the female-breadwinner model, where the woman 
is the main earner; and 5) the situation where both partners are unemployed. 
There is abundance of literature showing cross-national variation in work-family arrangements in 
Western countries (Hook, 2015; Lewis et al., 2008; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 
2009; Korpi, 2000; Crompton et al., 2007; Gornick and Meyers, 2009). Studies have shown that 
dual-earner households are the most common in northern European countries. Instead, the one-and a 
half-earner prevails in continental Europe, the UK and Ireland, while the male-breadwinner model 
is more diffuse in Mediterranean countries, where the dual-earner model is nonetheless rather 
diffuse. For example, Lewis and colleagues (2008) use data on 13 countries from the 2004 
European Social Survey to show that the full-time dual earner model is truly present only in 
northern Europe (e.g. 55% of couples in Denmark and 59% in Finland), where policies are effective 
in allowing work-family reconciliation. In contrast, male breadwinning is still very widespread in 
southern Europe where it coexists with dual-earning, while female part-time of various lengths is 
used to reconcile work and family needs in continental countries. Hook (2015) uses cluster analysis 
on Luxembourg Income Study data and European Social Survey data to study work-family 
arrangements in 16 countries. The author finds that countries cluster in three groups based on what 
arrangement is more common: a group of Nordic countries where dual-earning is prevalent; a mixed 
group including some continental countries plus the UK, Ireland and Japan, where one-and-a half-
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earning is most common; and finally a group comprising the Mediterranean countries plus the US 
and France, where households ‘polarize’ between dual-earning and male-breadwinning. Once 
women’s education is included in the analyses, however, the clusters partially change. While the 
group of Nordic dual-earning countries remains unchanged, a strong stratification in employment 
arrangements by women’s level of education emerges in a new group comprising the Mediterranean 
countries, the UK, Ireland and Austria. Instead, the one-and-a-half-model appears truly dominant in 
the group of continental countries plus Japan, regardless of education. Bettio and Plantenga (2004), 
focusing on care regimes rather explicitly on work-family arrangements, show that in southern 
Europe a much larger proportion of women is inactive due to care responsibilities compared to 
continental and northern countries, indicating that the male-breadwinner model is much more 
common in this area than elsewhere. Other studies focusing on the distribution of employment in 
European households have reached similar conclusions (Korpi, 2000; Gornick and Meyers, 2009; 
Esping-Andersen, 2009). 
The explanations for cross-national variation in work-family arrangements are generally based 
on the countries’ degree of familialism, a concept that over the years has received several 
refinements in the literature (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Leitner, 2003; Saraceno and Keck, 2008). 
Indeed, in de-familialist2 contexts, such as Scandinavian countries, the employment of both partners 
is made possible thanks to extensive family support provided by the state in terms of, for example, 
childcare services for small children and parental leaves (Kleider, 2015; Lohmann and Zagel, 2016; 
Hook, 2015; Lewis et al., 2008; De Henau et al., 2010; Gornick et al., 1997, 1998; Korpi, 2000; 
Gornick and Meyers, 2009; Leitner, 2003). In contrast, in familialist contexts such as southern 
Europe and some continental countries, women are expected to take responsibility for childcare and 
elderly care, limiting female employment. Finally, in non-familialist countries − typically liberal 
countries such as the UK − a mix of market and private arrangements puts women in the position of 
secondary earners. 
The relationship between a country’s level of familialism and work-family arrangements is 
found to be mediated by the couple’s class and, in particular, by the woman’s level of education 
(Hook, 2015). Highly educated women, indeed, are more likely to be full-time employed 
(Thévenon, 2013; OECD, 2016) and to have a preference for employment vs. homemaking (Hakim, 
2000). Moreover, employed women with higher education tend to have high earnings and are in a 
better position to outsource domestic work (Gupta, 2006) and purchase childcare (De Henau et al., 
                                                          
2 De-familialism is used by Esping-Andersen (1999) with reference to the Scandinavian countries while Leitner (2003) 
uses the term optional familialism for this group of countries to indicate that the welfare state provides options to 
families so they can choose between family services and family subsidies. In contrast, Leitner (2003) uses the term de-
familialism for liberal countries such as the UK. 
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2010), thus having to rely on state support less than lower educated women. As a result, scholars 
have underlined an important interaction between work-family arrangements, women’s education 
and familialism: in countries with low de-familialization, lower educated women are less likely to 
be employed; in de-familialized countries, instead, education is less relevant (Hook, 2015). 
It is an open question whether and how the 2008-09 economic downturn affected work-family 
arrangements in countries hit differently by the crisis, in particular considering that austerity 
measures could have impacted states’ ability to de-familize care work. These issues as discussed in 
the next section where we also draw the hypotheses. 
 
The economic crisis and changes in work-family arrangements: hypotheses 
The recent financial and economic crisis had different repercussions across European states. 
While some countries, such as Germany and France, were only slightly hit, others such as Greece 
and Spain suffered to a much larger extent from the economic crisis first and from the severing debt 
crisis afterwards (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). Official data on growth and unemployment rates 
can help formulate hypotheses on changing work-family arrangements in cross-national 
perspective. Table 1 below shows the GDP growth in the six selected countries from 2005 to 2015. 
All countries experienced negative growth in 2009. However, negative growth characterized only 
Greece and Spain in the following years. Germany, Sweden, the UK and France experienced a drop 
in GDP in 2009 but began to grow again in 2010. In contrast, GPD growth remained negative in 
Spain and Greece until 2013, the years of what is now known as the “Great Recession” (Jenkins et 
al., 2013). Considering the worsening economic conditions for both women and men in countries 
worst hit by the economic crisis, we except greater changes in work-family arrangements in Greece 
and Spain compared to the other countries. To begin with, we anticipate declines in dual-earner 
couples (H1) and increases in no-earner couples (H2) in these two countries. 
[Table 1 here] 
Scholars have argued that women and men respond differently to economic downturns (Hoynes 
et al., 2012; Karamessini and Rubery, 2014). Therefore, changes in work-family arrangements 
could have occurred in different ways. Since manufacturing and constructions ‒ two areas that are 
typically male dominated ‒ were the first to take the hit of the crisis, a decrease in male 
employment could have led to an increase in female-breadwinner households. Moreover, added 
worker effects would predict greater labor force participation of women whose partners have been 
laid off or had their working hours reduced (Lundberg, 1985; Prieto-Rodríguez and Rodríguez-
Gutiérrez, 2003). However, the subsequent austerity measures that were adopted targeted the public 
sector, both trough cuts in an area of employment that is female dominated but also in services that 
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are typically used more by women than by men (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). Thus, women 
could either have been let go from their jobs, or had to leave their jobs due to cuts in services such 
as child or elderly care (Gonzales Gago and Segales Kirzner, 2014). 
Thus, we test two alternative hypotheses to address the directions of the changes in work-family 
arrangement. If women’s labor market positions have been more hit, then male-breadwinner 
households will become more prominent than dual-earner and female-breadwinner households 
(H3a). If, instead, men have been more hit by the economic consequences of the crisis, then we 
expect female-main-earner households to increase at the expenses of dual-earner and male-
breadwinner households (H3b). Again, we expect the alternative outcomes to occur in the two 
countries worst hit by crisis: Spain and Greece. 
It is more complicated to formulate hypotheses on changes in one-and-a-half-earner households. 
On the one hand, an increase in this type of couple could result either from women in dual-earner 
couples reducing their working hours or from women in male-breadwinning households who start 
working part-time. On the other hand, if men lose their jobs, then one-and-a-half-earner households 
become female-main-earner households. If men reduce their working hours, they become dual-part-
time household. Based on these contrasting expectations, we take an explorative approach towards 
the evolution of one-and-a-half-earner households and refrain from making a definite hypothesis. 
Finally, changes in (un)employment in response to the economic crisis depend on the education 
and skills of the worker. Typically, low skilled workers are the first to take the hit and to bear the 
worst consequences of the crisis. Official Eurostat data give important indications on differences in 
the unemployment rates of women and men with low (ISCED3 0-2), medium (ISCED 3-4) and high 
(ISCED 5-6) levels of education from 2005 to 2014 in the six countries (Eurostat, 2016). Overall, 
unemployment rates have increased in all countries except Germany. In Greece, losses in 
employment where large for all levels of education, although in relative terms the less educated 
were the most hit. For example, unemployment for low educated men went from 6.2% in 2005 to 
27.4% in 2014 (+342%) and from 14.6% to 31% for low educated women (+111%). Increases in 
unemployment were impressive in Spain as well, with the most hit being low and medium educated 
men (+284% and + 243%). The unemployment increase in France was not nearly as severe, 
although the number of unemployed doubled among low educated men. Importantly, gender 
differences in unemployment rates are smaller in France than in Spain and Greece, over the period 
and between levels of education. In Sweden, increases in unemployment where confined to the 
lower educated, as unemployment rose from 13.1% to 18.6% among low educated men (+42%) and 
                                                          
3 ISCED 0-2: pre-primary education, primary education and lower secondary education. ISCED 3-4: upper secondary 
education and post-secondary non tertiary education; ISCED 5-6: first stage and second of tertiary education. 
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from 16.2% to 21.7% among low educated women (+34%). Unemployment among medium and 
high educated women and men slightly decreased over the considered period. Finally, in the UK 
unemployment grew more for women than for men, especially among the low educated (+72% for 
women vs. +28% for men) and the high educated (+39% for women vs. +10% for men). Losses for 
the medium educated were similar between women and men (+56% and +54% respectively). These 
figures point to the importance of human capital for being and staying in employment and to 
relevant cross-national differences in this respect. Thus, we anticipate that women’s educational 
level will be decisive for changes in work-family arrangements in Greece and Spain. In particular, 
higher education should shield women against unemployment risks in the two crisis-struck 
countries. Therefore, we expect that the higher women's level of education, the smaller the impact 
of the crisis on dual-earning (H4a) and no-earning (H4b). Furthermore, we hypothesize that the 
higher women's level of education, the smaller the impact of the crisis on male-breadwinning (H4c) 
and the higher on female-breadwinning (H4d). 
 
Methodology 
Data and sample 
The analyses are based on data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions from 2005 to 2012 (EU-SILC, 2005/2012). The EU-SILC is a cross-national database 
covering a large number of European countries. Its aim is collecting timely data on income among 
European households and it allows studying poverty and social exclusion in diverse institutional 
settings and over time. The data are appropriate for the study as they contain information on the 
entire household, enabling us to reconstruct detailed work-family arrangements over time. As 
anticipated, we restrict the analysis to six countries: Germany (DE, N 38,911), Greece (EL, N 
18,863), Spain (ES, N 45,029), France (FR, N 36,347), Sweden (SE, N 24,963) and the United 
Kingdom (UK, N 23,497). The six countries belong to different welfare and gender regimes 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Korpi, 2000), are characterized by different work-family arrangements 
(Lewis et al., 2008; Hook, 2015) and were affected differently by the 2008/2009 economic 
downturn (Jenkins et al., 2013; Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). Therefore, they lend themselves 
well for international comparison. In each country, we select women living with a male partner and 
who may or may not have children4. Women are selected so that both partners are working age, that 
is, between 19 and 60 years old. Overall, we have a total of 187,610 women. 
Dependent variable 
                                                          
4 Analyses conducted excluding childless couples yielded consistent findings. Result available from the author upon 
request. 
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The dependent variable is the work-family arrangement of the couple. Self-defined current 
economic status is used to define whether each partner is employed full-time, part-time or not 
employed. The distinction between part-time and full-time is based on the respondent’s claim of 
being in full-time or part-time work and not on actual working hours. However, descriptive 
statistics show that self-defined part-time workers report on average 22 hours of employment per 
week vs. about 41 hours of full-time workers. The not employed category includes a variety of 
options including being unemployed, student, unfit to work or physically challenged, in early 
retirement, or full-filling domestic tasks or care responsibilities. By combining the employment 
statuses of the two partners we obtain a categorical dependent variable with five outcomes: 
1) Dual-earners: partners are employed either both full-time or both part-time. 
2) No-earner: neither partner employed. 
3) Male-breadwinner: man employed, woman not employed. 
4) Female-main-earner: woman employed, man not employed or employed part-time. 
5) One-and-a-half-earner: man employed full-time, woman employed part-time5. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of work-family arrangements in the six considered countries 
polling together the years from 2005 to 2012 (EU-SILC 2005/2012, own calculation). Sweden is the 
country with the greatest proportion of dual-earner households (about 0.52). Greece, France, the 
United Kingdom and Spain have about 0.40 of dual earners followed at a length by Germany (0.24), 
where the one-and-a-half-model prevails (0.38). This arrangement is also common in the UK (0.27), 
Sweden (0.25) and France (0.22), much less so in Greece (0.07) and Spain (0.11), where the male-
breadwinner model is much more present (0.36 and 0.34 respectively). The male-breadwinner type 
is not uncommon in Germany either (0.25). Little variation is present among female-breadwinners, 
close to 0.07 in all six countries. No-earner households are few as well in all countries, but they are 
unsurprisingly more diffuse in the two countries hit badly be the crisis, Greece (0.08) and Spain 
(0.086), than elsewhere. Hence, as a whole, our data match well with previous cross-national 
classifications of work-family arrangements. 
[Figure 2 here] 
Independent variables 
To test whether work-family arrangements have changed from before to after the economic 
crisis, we use a categorical time-variable with three outcomes: pre-crisis (years 2005, 2006, 2007), 
beginning of the crisis / global financial crisis (years 2008 and 2009), full crisis / recession (2010, 
2011 and 2012). The pre-crisis category is the reference in the models. We then use the women’s 
                                                          
5 No hypothesis refers to this outcome, but for completeness it is included in the dependent variable and the results are 
briefly discussed as well. 
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level of education to investigate whether changes in work-family arrangements have taken place at 
different levels of the social strata. Specifically, we contrast low education (ISCED <=2 as 
reference category) with medium (ISCED 3 and 4) and high education (ISCED 5 and 6). Finally, to 
test for country difference, country dummies are included using Germany as reference category. 
 
Controls 
All models control for women’s age; the age of the partner; the couple’s marital status (married 
as reference vs. not legally married); the partner’s level of education ‒ low (ISCED <=2 as 
reference category), medium (ISCED 3 and 4) and high (ISCED 5 and 6); the number of children in 
the household (no children as reference, vs. one child, two children, three or more); the age of the 
smallest child present (no children in the household as reference, 0 to 5 years old, 6 to 12 years old, 
13 and older). Summary statistics for all the variables by country and overall are presented in Table 
2. 
 
Method 
Since the dependent variable is nominal, multinomial logistic regression models are used (Long 
and Freese, 2014) on the pooled sampled of six countries. Several models have been estimated by 
adding in succession groups of variables. The first model includes only control variables. The 
second model adds women’s level of education. Model three includes also the time variable while 
model four further adds the country dummies. Finally, to test the hypotheses, three-way interactions 
between women’s level of education, the time variable and the country are used in model five. For 
space limitations, only the results for the fully interacted model are presented in Table A1 in the 
online appendix. To ensure the best possible comprehension of the results, rather than discuss the 
model coefficients, the average predicted probabilities of the five outcomes for each country by 
year and level of education have been estimated and are displayed in figure 4. Moreover, figure 5 
reports average marginal effects by level of education and country which allow assessing whether 
the hypotheses are confirmed. 
 
Results 
Considerable developments in work-family arrangements over the considered period can be seen 
in figure 3, especially in some countries. While the proportion of dual-earner households peaked in 
2008 and then began to decline in Greece and Spain, female-breadwinner households were on the 
rise, suggesting important losses of male employment, possibly due to the economic crisis and 
consistent with the official data discussed earlier. Instead, increases in dual-earners are observed in 
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the UK, Germany and Sweden over the entire period. We also observe a decline of the male-
breadwinner model in all six countries, though more pronounced in Spain and Greece than 
elsewhere. Female-breadwinner and no-earner households have remained quite stable over the years 
in the UK, Germany and Sweden, but have increased in Greece and Spain. The one-and-a-half-
earner model remained rather stable everywhere except in Germany. 
[Figure 3 here] 
These overall averages likely mask important within country differences. Therefore, the results 
from the multinomial logistic models presented below investigate whether households from 
different social background, proxied via women’s education, are more exposed to changing work-
family arrangements compared to others. Panels from a) to e) in Figure 4 show the average 
predicted probabilities for each outcome in each country conditioning on the year and the woman’s 
level of education. 
Starting from panel a), we can see that highly educated women in all countries are more likely to 
be in dual-earner households than medium or low educated ones. Moreover, while there has been an 
increase in the probabilities of being in a dual-earner couple for high educated women in Germany, 
France, Sweden and the UK, in the two countries most badly hit by the economic crisis, Greece and 
Spain, the probabilities have decreased after 2008/09, especially in Greece. This result indicates that 
the economic crisis had negative effects even among households at the higher end of the social 
strata. Moreover, while low and medium educated women increased or at worst maintained their 
chances of being dual-earners in Germany, France and Sweden, the probabilities of these groups 
decreased in Spain, Greece and the UK for the low educated. 
Panel b) shows the chances of the opposite situation: being both unemployed. Of course and 
fortunately the overall probability of this happening are much lower compared to the previous 
outcome. In all countries, low educated women are the most likely to be in no-earner households. 
Moreover, after 2008/2009, the chances of being no-earner households among low educated women 
increased notably in Greece, Spain and the UK. Small increases are observed also in France and the 
Sweden, while the probability actually declined in Germany. Importantly, the chances of this 
outcome for medium and high educated women remained stable or even decreased in all countries 
except Spain and Greece, again indicating that the crisis led to negative economic outcomes across 
all levels of society. 
Panel c) shows the predicted probabilities of being in a male-breadwinner household. The 
chances of being in a male-breadwinner household decrease with education in all countries: the 
lower the woman’s level of education, the higher the chances of being in this work-family 
arrangement. As for changes over time, the results for France, Sweden and the United Kingdom 
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show little if any variation, with small or no declines in male-breadwinning. The most evident 
decline is for low educated women in Sweden. Reductions among German women are more 
pronounced, especially for the medium educated. In Greece and Spain, where this work-family 
arrangement is overall more common than elsewhere, the probabilities of being in a male-
breadwinner household have remained stable for high educated women, while they have fallen for 
low educated ones. The two countries diverge in the destinies of medium educated women, for 
whom no changes are observed in Greece, while their chances of being homemakers decreased 
from 2005/07 to 2008/09 and then increased somewhat again in Spain. 
The predicted probabilities for being a female-main-earner are plotted in panel d). The likelihood 
of being in this outcome have changed very little in France and Sweden, while more action took 
place in the other four countries. In Germany, the probabilities for high educated women decreased, 
signaling improvements in men’s employment situation, while those for low educated women 
somewhat increased. Instead, in Greece and Spain all women experienced a rise in this outcome. 
This result is evident also in the UK but mostly for low educated women. These findings suggest 
worsening labor market situations for all men in Greece and Spain and lower class men in the UK. 
Lastly, panel e) shows the results for the one-and-a-half-model. Probabilities of this outcome are 
notably higher in Germany than elsewhere (note the differences in the y-axes), especially for the 
medium educated. Moreover, while the chances remained rather constant over the period in Spain, 
Greece, France and the UK, in Germany low and medium educated women are increasingly likely 
to be in one-and-a-half-earner household. To the contrary, chances of this outcome diminished in 
Sweden especially for medium and low educated women. 
[Figure 4 here] 
To link these results with the hypotheses, the panels in Figure 5 report average marginal effects 
calculated from the three-way interaction between level of education, year and country. The graph 
shows, for each outcome, the differences in probability between 2005/07 and 2008/09 and between 
2005/07 and 2010/12 for all levels of education. H1 is confirmed: there have been significant 
reductions in the proportion of dual-earners at all levels of education in Greece and Spain but not 
elsewhere. Symmetrically, and confirming H2, we observe a significant increase in no-earner 
households in these two countries but not elsewhere, except for low educated women in the UK. As 
the competing hypotheses, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of households with 
female-main-earners and a significant decline in breadwinning in Greece. This finding brings 
support to hypothesis H3b as opposed to H3a and suggests that, in the two countries, men’s 
employment has been the most to suffer from the crisis. Finally, for what regards educational 
differences, the hypotheses are only partially confirmed. Contrary to H4a and H4b, the results show 
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that the negative effects of the economic downturn were spread to all three educational levels, so 
that women with low, medium and high levels of education were all less likely to be in dual-earner 
and more likely to be in no-earner couples after the crisis. High education seems to have had a 
protective effect from no-earning only in Spain. Moreover, lower educated women were the least 
likely to be in male-breadwinning households after the crisis, going against H4c. Instead, women 
with higher education were more likely to be female-main-earners after the crisis compared to less 
educated women in both countries, confirming H4d. 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This article has contributed to the literature by investigating the changes that have occurred in 
work-family arrangements during the crucial years of the economic crisis and subsequent recession 
in six European countries: Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Specifically, using eight years of EU-SILC data (from 2005 to 2012) the article addressed whether 
the crisis led to a decrease in the proportion of dual-earner households to the advantage of other 
household types and whether shifts in household work arrangements have taken place at different 
levels of the social strata. 
Several results have emerged from the analyses. First of all, the findings have confirmed that 
large differences in work-family arrangements in Europe still exist, and that the male-breadwinner 
model in southern Europe is all but disappeared, especially at low levels of female education. Thus, 
despite changes in recent decades, many European couples are still task-specialized, reflecting 
different preferences regarding the division of labor between partners (Edlund and Öun, 2016). 
Second, the results indicate that dual-earner households have indeed decreased over the years in 
countries worst hit by the economic crisis, that is Greece and Spain, where no-earning households 
have instead increased. Third, the findings show that in these two countries all social groups ‒ 
proxied by women’s level of education ‒ suffered from the economic consequences of the crisis. 
Indeed, reductions in dual-earning households can be observed not just among the low educated but 
also among the medium and high educated. This result, party in contrast with previous findings that 
show how lower social strata are the most vulnerable to economic downturns (Hoynes et al., 2012), 
sends the preoccupying message that nobody was spared from the devastating consequences of the 
crisis in Greece and, to a smaller extent, in Spain. As for other household types, the findings reveal 
increases in female-main-earner households in Greece and Spain at all levels of education but 
mostly among the high educated. In contrast, male-breadwinner households have decreased notably 
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among women with low levels of education especially in Greece and Spain but also in the other 
four countries. 
These results suggest diverging paths for work-family arrangements among countries that 
suffered the economic crisis differently. In countries where the crisis was not especially harsh, dual-
earners have increased and male-breadwinners have diminished at all levels of education. At the 
same time, no-earner households have remained stable at medium and high levels of education and 
only marginally increased among the less educated, typically the most vulnerable to economic 
fluctuations. This situation is likely what policy makers would consider a positive evolution in 
work-family arrangements. What happened in Greece and Spain is somewhat more troubling. 
Indeed, the fact that male-breadwinner households have been declining and that female-main-
earners have been growing might seem a positive evolution for gender equality in work-family 
arrangements. Having more families with breadwinning women could balance off the predominance 
of the male-breadwinner model and this in principal could yield a more equal gender balance at the 
societal level. However, the extent to which such changes come with a decrease in dual-earner 
households and an increase in no-earner households suggests that the overall consequences of the 
economic crisis on work-family arrangements have been far but positive. To the contrary, it is likely 
that increases in male unemployment led to reductions in dual-earner and male-breadwinner 
households to the advantage of no-earner and likely poorer female-main-earner households. 
Although it is not possible to validate this interpretation with cross-sectional data, the growth of 
both male and female unemployment suggests that this might be the case. 
There are two limitations to this study that need mentioning. First and foremost, the cross-
sectional nature of the data impedes making causal statements about how the crisis affected moves 
from and to different household types. Ideally, retrospective data would be needed to address 
changes in employment at the couple level over the considered years. Unfortunately, such data is 
not readily available. The closest approximation could be the longitudinal component of the EU-
SILC which, however, covers a maximum of four years per household, generally less, so it would 
only allow the observation of the changes in work-family arrangements from immediately before to 
immediately after the beginning of the crisis, for example from 2009 to 2012. Thus, for the present 
article we have chosen to privilege the study of a large observation window even if this means 
abstaining from making causal inferences. Second, due to the complexity of the dependent variable 
with five outcomes, we decided to focus on a limited number of countries, as presenting the results 
for a multinomial logit for a wider set of cases would have made the results extremely cumbersome 
to present and read. We acknowledge that a different set of countries might have yielded different 
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results but, at the same time, we believe that our selection covers a range of countries with different 
institutional characteristics which makes the cross-national comparison worthwhile and meaningful. 
Future research will have to update the study of changing work-family arrangements in Europe 
as the effects of the crisis diminsh. For certain, the cross-national differences in work-family 
arrangements that had been steadily disappearing over the nineties and noughties are again well 
visible today, and the gap in female employment between de-familized and familized countries that 
had been slowly closing over the past decades has now evidently reopened. In particular, important 
reductions in dual earning have emerged especially in Greece and Spain. As the two countries 
slowly recover from the economic crisis, it remains to be seen what will happen to the distribution 
of employment within households in the upcoming years. 
 
Disclaimer: This article is based on data from Eurostat, EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (2005/2015). The responsibility for all conclusions drawn from the data lies entirely 
with the author. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1 Gross domestic product - expenditure approach. Growth rate compared to the same quarter 
of the previous year, seasonally adjusted. 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
France 1.6  2.4  2.4  0.2  -2.9  2.0  2.1  0.2  0.6  0.6  1.3  
Germany 0.7  3.7  3.3  1.1  -5.6  4.1  3.7  0.5  0.5  1.6  1.7  
Greece 0.6  5.7  3.3  -0.3  -4.3  -5.5  -9.1  -7.3  -3.2  0.7  -0.2  
Spain 3.7  4.2  3.8  1.1  -3.6  0.0  -1.0  -2.6  -1.7  1.4  3.2  
Sweden 2.8  4.7  3.4  -0.6  -5.2  6.0  2.7  -0.3  1.2  2.3  4.2  
UK 3.0  2.5  2.6  -0.6  -4.3  1.9  1.5  1.3  1.9  3.1  2.2  
Data extracted on 24 Aug 2016 08:56 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
Shaded cells indicate negative or no growth. 
 
Table 2 Summary statistics by country and overall. 
 Germany Greece Spain France Sweden United 
Kingdom 
Total 
 
Work-family arrangements 
Dual-earner  .24  .41  .39  .43  .52  .41  .39 
No-earner .049 .081 .086  .06 .039 .064 .064 
Male-breadwinner  .25  .36  .34   .2  .13  .18  .25 
Female-main-earner .084 .072 .075 .092  .07 .072 .079 
One-and-a-half-earner  .38 .073  .11  .22  .25  .27  .22 
 
Time 
2005/2007   .4  .37  .38  .37  .38  .44  .39 
2008/2009  .25  .28  .26  .25  .27  .22  .25 
2010/2012  .35  .35  .36  .38  .35  .34  .36 
        
Age   43   42   42   41   41   41   42 
Age of the partner   45   46   45   43   44   44   44 
        
Marital status        
Not married  .13 .019   .1  .28  .35  .21  .18 
Married  .87  .98   .9  .72  .65  .79  .82 
        
Education 
Low  .08  .35  .47  .22 .083  .12  .23 
Medium  .58  .41  .23  .44  .51  .49  .43 
High  .34  .25  .31  .33  .41  .39  .34 
 
Partner’s education 
Low .046  .37  .48   .2  .13  .14  .24 
Medium   .5  .38  .23  .51  .58   .5  .44 
High  .46  .25  .29  .29  .29  .37  .33 
 
Age of the youngest child 
No children  .33  .18  .19  .28  .28  .34  .27 
0-5   .2  .25  .25  .27  .26  .26  .25 
6-12  .19  .21  .21   .2  .18  .18   .2 
13+  .28  .36  .35  .25  .28  .22  .29 
        
22 
 
N° children        
None  .32  .18  .19  .28  .28  .34  .26 
One  .28  .31  .31  .24  .24  .24  .27 
Two   .3  .39   .4  .32  .34   .3  .34 
Three + .091  .12   .1  .16  .15  .12  .12 
        
N 38,911 18,863 45,029 36,347 24,963 23,497 187,610 
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Figure 1 Female and male employment rates in six European countries. Eurostat (2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of work-family arrangements in six European countries. EU-SILC, 
2005/2012, own calculation. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of work-family arrangements over time in six European countries. EU-SILC, 2005/2012, own calculation 
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Figure 4 Work family arrangements by level of education over time in six European countries. 
Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence bounds. EU-SILC, 2005/2012, own calculation. 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
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Figure 5 Marginal effects and 95% confidence intervals of education and time on five outcomes in 
six European countries. EU-SILC, 2005/2012, own calculation. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
 
e) 
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Online Appendix 
Table A1 Multinomial logistic regression models predicting work-family arrangements. Women age 19-60. 
Baseline category: dual-earner 
 No-earner One-and-a-half-
earner 
Female-main-
earner 
Male-breadwinner 
Age -0.000 0.015*** -0.011*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age partner 0.055*** 0.004* 0.054*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Marital status (Married r.c.) 
Not married 0.281*** -0.317*** 0.229*** -0.210*** 
 (0.031) (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) 
Partner's level of education (Low ed. r.c.) 
Partner medium ed. -0.566*** -0.049* -0.403*** -0.153*** 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.026) (0.018) 
Partner high ed. -0.874*** -0.062** -0.747*** -0.046* 
 (0.034) (0.023) (0.029) (0.020) 
Age of the smallest child (No children r.c.) 
0-5 0.526** 1.197*** -0.143 0.793*** 
 (0.173) (0.162) (0.151) (0.122) 
6-12 -0.384* 1.036*** -0.441** 0.049 
 (0.173) (0.162) (0.151) (0.122) 
13+ -0.421* 0.503** -0.541*** -0.217 
 (0.171) (0.161) (0.150) (0.122) 
Number of children (None r.c.) 
One -0.012 -0.049 0.292 0.271* 
 (0.171) (0.162) (0.150) (0.122) 
Two -0.167 0.217 0.104 0.411*** 
 (0.173) (0.162) (0.151) (0.122) 
Three or more 0.491** 0.256 0.325* 0.872*** 
 (0.174) (0.163) (0.153) (0.123) 
Year (2005-2007 r.c.) 
2008-2009 -0.438* -0.061 -0.182 -0.110 
 (0.179) (0.156) (0.203) (0.153) 
2010/2012 -0.607*** -0.031 -0.051 -0.286* 
 (0.166) (0.142) (0.181) (0.141) 
Level of education (Low ed. r.c.) 
Medium ed. -1.276*** -0.227* -0.394** -0.616*** 
 (0.122) (0.106) (0.138) (0.104) 
High ed. -2.350*** -0.804*** -0.458** -1.523*** 
 (0.140) (0.107) (0.139) (0.107) 
Country (Germany r.c.) 
Greece -1.693*** -2.349*** -1.614*** -0.802*** 
 (0.131) (0.126) (0.156) (0.110) 
Spain -1.395*** -1.996*** -1.365*** -0.520*** 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.140) (0.103) 
France -1.503*** -1.436*** -0.885*** -1.182*** 
 (0.126) (0.113) (0.143) (0.109) 
Sweden -1.906*** -1.578*** -1.398*** -1.533*** 
 (0.164) (0.139) (0.184) (0.133) 
UK -1.139*** -1.052*** -1.523*** -1.231*** 
 (0.138) (0.126) (0.177) (0.124) 
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Table A1 Continued Multinomial logistic regression models predicting work-family arrangements. 
Women age 19-60. Baseline category: dual-earner 
 No-earner One-and-a-
half-earner 
Female-main-
earner 
Male-
breadwinner 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. 0.109 -0.005 0.056 -0.127 
 (0.198) (0.163) (0.215) (0.161) 
2008-2009 × High ed. -0.135 -0.149 -0.282 -0.237 
 (0.234) (0.166) (0.220) (0.166) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. -0.015 -0.075 -0.286 -0.129 
 (0.183) (0.149) (0.193) (0.148) 
2010/2012 × High ed. -0.015 -0.144 -0.399* -0.077 
 (0.212) (0.151) (0.195) (0.153) 
2008-2009 × Greece 0.198 -0.168 0.235 -0.134 
 (0.210) (0.198) (0.241) (0.170) 
2008-2009 × Spain 0.608** 0.100 0.538* -0.049 
 (0.189) (0.169) (0.216) (0.159) 
2008-2009 × France 0.542** 0.023 0.301 0.043 
 (0.202) (0.177) (0.224) (0.170) 
2008-2009 × Sweden 0.582* 0.292 0.365 0.056 
 (0.262) (0.216) (0.289) (0.211) 
2008-2009 × UK 0.403 -0.076 0.527 0.017 
 (0.234) (0.210) (0.286) (0.206) 
2010/2012 × Greece 1.004*** -0.038 0.703** 0.161 
 (0.193) (0.184) (0.216) (0.159) 
2010/2012 × Spain 1.284*** 0.108 0.775*** 0.199 
 (0.175) (0.155) (0.194) (0.147) 
2010/2012 × France 0.771*** -0.001 0.161 0.236 
 (0.188) (0.163) (0.203) (0.158) 
2010/2012 × Sweden 0.794** 0.045 0.144 0.077 
 (0.246) (0.205) (0.271) (0.200) 
2010/2012 × UK 1.072*** 0.102 0.834** 0.392* 
 (0.216) (0.196) (0.259) (0.194) 
Medium ed. × Greece 0.664*** -0.217 0.310 0.185 
 (0.167) (0.150) (0.187) (0.122) 
Medium ed. × Spain 0.014 -0.057 0.006 -0.284* 
 (0.155) (0.124) (0.166) (0.114) 
Medium ed. × France 0.501*** 0.050 0.093 -0.087 
 (0.147) (0.122) (0.158) (0.119) 
Medium ed. × Sweden 0.176 0.385** 0.268 -0.154 
 (0.190) (0.147) (0.198) (0.143) 
Medium ed. × UK 0.230 -0.049 0.566** -0.018 
 (0.159) (0.134) (0.191) (0.133) 
High ed. × Greece 0.482* -0.657*** 0.218 -0.374** 
 (0.238) (0.176) (0.198) (0.135) 
High ed. × Spain 0.080 -0.150 -0.077 -0.435*** 
 (0.184) (0.125) (0.163) (0.117) 
High ed. × France 0.531** 0.351** 0.063 0.123 
 (0.188) (0.125) (0.163) (0.125) 
High ed. × Sweden 1.010*** 0.311* 0.277 0.105 
 (0.211) (0.150) (0.202) (0.149) 
High ed. × UK 0.880*** 0.315* 0.873*** 0.456** 
 (0.184) (0.137) (0.194) (0.139) 
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Table A1 Continued Multinomial logistic regression models predicting work-family arrangements. Women 
age 19-60. Baseline category: dual-earner 
 No-earner One-and-a-
half-earner 
Female-
main-earner 
Male-
breadwinner 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. × Greece 0.193 0.110 0.010 0.302 
 (0.263) (0.234) (0.285) (0.189) 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. × Spain 0.065 -0.097 0.013 0.119 
 (0.241) (0.193) (0.253) (0.178) 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. × France -0.413 0.067 -0.158 0.155 
 (0.239) (0.192) (0.248) (0.187) 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. × Sweden -0.197 -0.186 -0.305 -0.004 
 (0.302) (0.228) (0.311) (0.228) 
2008-2009 × Medium ed. × UK -0.165 0.192 -0.542 0.121 
 (0.270) (0.224) (0.312) (0.223) 
2008-2009 × High ed. × Greece 0.381 0.417 0.174 0.464* 
 (0.366) (0.266) (0.303) (0.207) 
2008-2009 × High ed. × Spain -0.062 0.150 0.154 0.217 
 (0.295) (0.193) (0.251) (0.182) 
2008-2009 × High ed. × France -0.024 0.126 -0.015 0.083 
 (0.304) (0.196) (0.258) (0.197) 
2008-2009 × High ed. × Sweden 0.107 -0.105 -0.099 0.023 
 (0.337) (0.233) (0.319) (0.238) 
2008-2009 × High ed. × UK -0.321 0.214 -0.374 0.013 
 (0.328) (0.228) (0.319) (0.233) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. × Greece 0.605* 0.273 0.409 0.489** 
 (0.236) (0.219) (0.254) (0.177) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. × Spain 0.109 -0.014 0.409 0.274 
 (0.220) (0.177) (0.226) (0.164) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. × France -0.417 0.058 0.139 0.037 
 (0.220) (0.175) (0.224) (0.172) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. × Sweden -0.203 -0.120 0.052 0.034 
 (0.284) (0.215) (0.291) (0.216) 
2010/2012 × Medium ed. × UK -0.392 0.075 -0.476 -0.061 
 (0.248) (0.208) (0.282) (0.208) 
2010/2012 × High ed. × Greece 0.533 0.682** 0.391 0.412* 
 (0.317) (0.244) (0.266) (0.193) 
2010/2012 × High ed. × Spain -0.115 0.065 0.270 0.086 
 (0.259) (0.176) (0.223) (0.167) 
2010/2012 × High ed. × France -0.598* 0.066 0.224 -0.164 
 (0.282) (0.179) (0.231) (0.181) 
2010/2012 × High ed. × Sweden -0.193 -0.025 0.131 -0.010 
 (0.313) (0.219) (0.296) (0.223) 
2010/2012 × High ed. × UK -1.129*** -0.109 -0.622* -0.294 
 (0.294) (0.211) (0.285) (0.215) 
Constant -1.670*** -0.432*** -1.883*** 0.358** 
 (0.137) (0.113) (0.146) (0.109) 
     
N 187,610 
Pseudo-R-squared. .09961 
Log-likelihood -240,397 
Chi-squared. 53,193 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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